Regionalism and Rivalry: Japan and the United States in Pacific Asia by Jeffry A. Frieden
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: Regionalism and Rivalry: Japan and the United States in Pacific
Asia
Volume Author/Editor: Jeffrey Frankel and Miles Kahler, editors
Volume Publisher: The University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-25999-4
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/fran93-1
Conference Date: April 2-5, 1992
Publication Date: January 1993
Chapter Title: Domestic Politics and Regional Cooperation: The United States,
Japan, and Pacific Money and Finance
Chapter Author: Jeffry A. Frieden
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c7844
Chapter pages in book: (p. 423 - 448)10  Domestic Politics and Regional 
Cooperation: The United States, 
Japan, and Pacific Money 
and Finance 
Jeffry A. Frieden 
10.1  Introduction 
International monetary and financial issues are central to Pacific economic 
relations. Financial flows in the Pacific region are of great size and economic 
importance. Movements in exchange rates and related macroeconomic vari- 
ables affect almost all economic activities in the region. 
The future of Pacific monetary and financial policies is, however, uncertain. 
Japan’s role in regional financial policymaking is not commensurate with its 
financial importance. Regional policies toward currency values and macroeco- 
nomic trends are nonexistent or embryonic. Interstate relations on these two 
dimensions might go in any number of directions, and the direction taken will 
have broad and deep implications for economic and noneconomic  develop- 
ments in the Pacific. 
This paper examines prospects for monetary and financial relations in the 
Pacific by focusing on Japanese and American policy in these arenas. It looks 
primarily at the domestic politics of international money and finance, particu- 
larly  how  the distributional  impact  of  different policies  within  the  United 
States and Japan affect policy choice. Its tentative conclusion is that groups 
favorable  to  international  monetary  and  financial  cooperation  are  gaining 
ground in Japan, where they have typically been relatively unimportant. Con- 
versely, “internationalist” groups are slipping in influence in the United States, 
although they remain very influential. 
Section 10.2  explores the contours of regional monetary and financial issues, 
the variety of conceivable outcomes, and analytical tools to understand policy 
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trends, especially the economic interest groups expected to affect the domestic 
politics of  different international monetary and financial policies. In  section 
10.3, these tools are applied to an important previous case in which similar 
issues were raised, that of the United States in the interwar years. Section 10.4 
looks at the economic interests at play in the formulation of Japanese policy 
toward international money and finance, and where they appear to be leading; 
section 10.5 does the same for the United States. In section 10.6, the essay’s 
implications and conclusions are summarized. 
10.2  The Problem: Cooperation or Conflict in Regional 
Money and Finance 
The principal concern for monetary and financial relations in the Pacific is 
that they might become unstable, which in turn might dampen regional flows 
of goods and capital. Most scenarios for such a breakdown involve one of two 
expectations of Japanese and American international monetary and financial 
policies. 
A first pessimistic scenario is that of  “Japan as free rider” on increasingly 
reticent American leadership. In this picture, the United States continues to act 
more or less alone in attempting to manage Pacific monetary  and financial 
relations, and incurs substantial costs to do so. Japan, however, is content to 
enjoy the benefits of American policies without paying for any of their costs. 
This would, in other words, be something of  a continuation of  the postwar 
pattern, in an era in which Japan is far better able to contribute to regional 
monetary and financial management than it once was-and  perhaps better able 
than the United States now is. Japanese refusal to play a bigger part in regional 
monetary and financial issues would probably precipitate an American refusal 
to continue its leadership, and an era of hostility and conflict between the two 
nations. 
A second pessimistic scenario is that of “Japan as bloc leader.” In this pic- 
ture, Japan responds to its newfound financial strength by carving out a zone 
of more or less exclusive monetary and financial influence in Asia. It seeks a 
formal or informal “yen zone,” with preferential treatment of the Japanese cur- 
rency and Japanese financial flows and discrimination against the dollar and 
American finance. Such Japanese policies would also precipitate a rupture with 
the United States. 
In  both  instances,  Japanese-American  conflict in monetary  and financial 
realms would almost certainly reduce the level of financial flows in the region, 
increase the unpredictability of exchange rates, and hamper trade. This would 
presumably bode ill for the economic and political stability of the region. 
The two pessimistic scenarios outlined above contrast implicitly with two 
optimistic scenarios in which Japan and the United States cooperate. The first 
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world’s leading nations, including Japan and the United States, on whatever 
issues may be important at the global level. A second optimistic view involves 
Japanese-American cooperation within the Pacific region, to ensure a favorable 
environment for regional financial flows, and to provide generally predictable 
regional exchange rates. Both scenarios seem to require that the Japanese gov- 
ernment play a more important role in global or regional financial policy; and 
that the Japanese government collaborate with other governments in the region 
or the world to stabilize macroeconomic conditions. In other words, the two 
governments would  either participate in joint management of  global money 
and finance, or would themselves jointly manage the region’s monetary and 
financial affairs. Either way, the outcome would be cooperative: the jointness 
of the management would guard against conflict among governments; the man- 
agement itself would provide economic and policy predictability. 
Both the optimistic and pessimistic scenarios imply a general model of the 
politics of  international money  and finance, specifically of  the role of  con- 
scious government supervision in these arenas and of intergovernmental coop- 
eration in such supervision. The implicit model is one in which the smooth 
functioning of international or regional monetary and financial systems re- 
quires certain enabling government policies, the enactment of which is difficult 
without explicit interstate cooperation. 
The most common assertion along these lines is that there are certain inter- 
national public goods in money and finance, which improve the welfare of all 
but which no one government has an incentive to provide. Analogies are typi- 
cally made to domestic money and finance, where price stability and a lender- 
of-last-resort function are the most commonly discussed public goods and a 
central bank often supplies them (a seminal discussion is in Kindleberger 1973, 
extended in Kindleberger 1985; see also Fratianni and Pattison 1982). 
It is unlikely that the cooperative ventures under discussion in this realm 
involve true public goods. Most of them aim at stabilizing international mone- 
tary and financial flows, in  the interest of  increasing levels of  international 
payments and trade. However, stability is not necessarily the best possible out- 
come for all concerned, especially as it typically involves maintenance of the 
status quo. Stabilizing exchange rates might involve setting relative prices that 
harm many producers or consumers, or that involve social welfare costs. Coor- 
dinating macroeconomic strategies might simply allow policymakers to rein- 
force each others’ socially undesirable policies. Protecting cross-border fi- 
nancial contracts might involve soaking poor debtors for the benefit of  rich 
creditors. It may  be morally comforting for supporters of  such measures to 
consider them public goods, but  analytically they  are probably club goods 
whose benefits accrue to some relatively limited group of actors. In this case, 
the concerns in question are of primary interest to those most heavily involved 
in international trade and payments, rather than public goods that benefit all 
without exception. This point will resurface in my discussion of the domestic 
politics of  interstate cooperation on these dimensions. To  avoid definitional 426  Jeffry A. Frieden 
controversy, I call the ventures in question club goods; those who believe they 
are truly public goods can simply regard the club in question to be society (or 
international society) as a whole. 
Whether or not the sorts of goods in question are primarily of public or club 
interest, their provision still creates problems of collective action. Even if only 
national monetary authorities have an interest in macroeconomic coordination 
(against the interests of their citizens, let us assume), they still need to work 
out a way  to cooperate among themselves. The cooperation problems raised 
can be divided into monetary and financial components. 
The club goods associated with international jnancial relations have to do 
with monitoring and enforcing cross-border loan contracts, maintaining open 
markets for debtor exports, supervising international financial institWions, and 
providing international liquidity in  times of  crisis. International lending de- 
pends on the credibility of borrower commitments to make debt service pay- 
ments; this credibility is a function both of the information available to lenders 
and of the ability of lenders to sanction errant borrowers. The provision of this 
information and the carrying out of these sanctions create significant collective 
action problems for real or potential lenders: once the information is available 
and the sanctions are in place, there is an incentive for individual lenders to 
free ride by  not helping gather information and by  evading sanctions. By the 
same token, international finance cannot long endure a major closure of goods 
markets-debtors  need to earn foreign exchange to service their debts. Credi- 
tor countries have an interest in open markets for debtor exports, but they might 
prefer that other countries’ markets be more open than theirs. 
The supervision of financial institutions involved in the international arena 
has become especially important, as electronic funds transfers can magnify the 
impact of an international bank failure. All international financial actors gain 
from the stability cooperative supervision can provide. However, all banks 
have an incentive to evade supervision, and all countries have an incentive to 
skimp on supervisory expenses and supervisory requirements in order to give 
their banks an advantage in international competition. Similar conditions apply 
to the role of  national monetary authorities in providing liquidity in times of 
international financial difficulty. 
In a sense, these considerations reflect the disjuncture between a regionally 
or globally integrated financial system and the absence of regional or global 
financial authorities. National authorities and judicial systems safeguard con- 
tracts, supervise financial markets, and provide lender-of-last-resort facilities 
within nations. As no international agency does similar duty, these functions 
must be carried out by national governments acting together. However, there 
are real incentives for free riding on the part of national governments. 
The club goods associated with international monetary relations raise simi- 
lar problems. Again by  a somewhat shaky analogy to the domestic order, just 
as national monetary authorities act to provide price stability, so does the inter- 
national monetary system function best when international relative prices are 427  The United States, Japan, and Pacific Money and Finance 
most stable. This involves both policies toward predictable exchange rates, and 
the coordination of national macroeconomic measures. In this sense, the crux 
of the regional problem on the monetary front is cooperative exchange rate and 
macroeconomic policies among national monetary authorities. 
For large countries, another major international monetary issue is the degree 
to which the national currency functions as a key currency for global or re- 
gional trade and payments. Just as a national money substantially lowers trans- 
actions costs and facilitates exchange domestically, so do reliable key currenc- 
ies  allow for higher levels of  global exchange. For a national currency to 
function well as a key currency, however, generally requires certain commit- 
ments from the currency’s home authorities. Especially important is stability 
in the real value of the currency-low  rates of inflation and nominal exchange 
rate volatility-and  generally deep and unencumbered national financial mar- 
kets in which economic agents can trade freely in assets denominated in the 
currency (Krugman 1984; Tavlas 1991).  These commitments, too, imply scope 
for national free riding (although there are direct advantages to key currency 
status for the issuing country). 
In any case, most visions of Pacific monetary and financial futures, whether 
pessimistic or optimistic, involve an implicit model of the provision (or under- 
provision) of these club or public goods. Some pessimistic views expect that 
Japan, the United States, or both will try to avoid paying the costs involved in 
helping provide these goods. Others anticipate that the two regional leaders 
will attempt to provide these services within smaller, more exclusive zones of 
influence-the  United States as monetary and financial dominator of the West- 
em Hemisphere, Japan of East Asia. Optimistic sentiments are motivated by 
the expectation that the region’s nations will recognize the gains associated 
with the cooperative provision of these collective goods and will act accord- 
ingly. They might do it as a joint U.S.-Japanese consortium, for the Pacific 
region; or globally, for the world as a whole. 
The general analytical approach appropriate to an evaluation of the likeli- 
hood of international cooperation has two component parts: the domestic poli- 
tics of  national foreign policies, and strategic interaction among potentially 
cooperating nations (Putnam 1988).  The first component part involves investi- 
gating different domestic socioeconomic and political realities. “National in- 
terests,’’ in this context, vary widely along with the interests of those in national 
societies. A state dominated by  foreign debtors in financial distress is more 
likely to downplay the importance of respecting cross-border loan contracts 
than a state dominated by major international creditors. This step looks at na- 
tional priorities, as determined by  domestic interests and institutions, to see 
what they might imply for the success of international or regional cooperation. 
Along these lines and for heuristic purposes, we can think of national politi- 
cal economics as divided into two camps: cooperative and competitive (for 
similar domestic approaches to foreign policy, see Gourevitch 1986; Ferguson 
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monetary and financial collective goods discussed above involve subordinat- 
ing domestic economic conditions to the demands of regional cooperation. For 
example, regional macroeconomic policy coordination by  definition means 
that policymakers’ goals involve more than purely domestic economic condi- 
tions. Allowing foreign debtors access to creditor markets may  be good for 
regional financial flows, but bad for domestic producers of goods with which 
debtor producers compete. 
Those in the cooperative or “internationalist” camp regard the costs associ- 
ated with their home country’s helping carry out global or regional monetary 
and financial leadership functions as minor compared to the benefits associated 
with smoothly running global or regional monetary and financial systems. Not 
surprisingly, those in this camp tend to be heavily committed to global or re- 
gional trade and payments; anything that hampers international money and fi- 
nance impinges directly on their well-being. The camp includes international 
financial investors and intermediaries, global corporations, major exporters, 
and consumers of imports. 
Competitive or “nationalist” economic groups are loathe to forgo the pri- 
macy of domestic conditions in national economic policymaking. They may 
not actively desire a reduction of cross-border goods and financial movements, 
but their priority is the state of the domestic economy-even  if this means that 
their  government eschews international cooperative agreements. Again,  it 
is not surprising that such groups are concentrated among those who make 
and sell goods and services for the home market, especially producers of non- 
tradables and of goods in direct competition with imports. Simply put and all 
else equal, the stronger the “internationalist” camp in any given national soci- 
ety, the more likely it is to desire and pursue cooperative international policies. 
To the extent that the internationalists are regionally oriented, their representa- 
tives will want to pursue regional cooperation; a global business orientation 
should lead to support for broader and more sweeping cooperative measures 
at the truly international level. On the other hand, the stronger the “nationalist” 
camp, the more likely it is to embark on unilateral ventures. 
Domestic politics is only the beginning of the story, however, for by  defini- 
tion international politics involves strategic interaction among nations. The 
second step, then, is to bring the tools of  the trade to bear on analyzing the 
problems of  international cooperation (as, for example, in Oye 1986; Eichen- 
green 1989a; Frankel 1988b). Even where states have similar interests in out- 
comes, problems associated with interstate cooperation may  arise due to the 
perils of collective action. Where these perils are reduced-where  accurate 
information is available, where commitment mechanisms reduce the risk of 
cheating, where it is possible to provide selective incentives to cooperators- 
regional cooperation is more likely to be forthcoming. 
The general method, then, involves looking both at the domestic politics of 
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collective action. An  examination of  regional collaboration toward interna- 
tional debt, for example, could specify the interests of different governments 
on the basis of the domestic political realities they face. It could then go on, 
within this context, to discuss how, given their interests, these different govern- 
ments might be able to work out cooperative agreements. 
For the purposes of this essay, I essentially ignore considerations of strategic 
interaction in order to focus on domestic political considerations associated 
with the provision of regional collective goods in the monetary and financial 
arenas. This is not to downplay collective action problems in general. It is 
driven largely by the belief that, at least in the Pacific monetary and financial 
realm, collective action problems are relatively unimportant. There are only 
two major actors, the United States and Japan, and their interactions are multi- 
dimensional and iterated. In this context, free riding would be hard to ascribe 
to the severe constraints of  such games as a single-shot prisoner’s dilemma. 
Failures of  cooperation are more liable to be the result of underlying policy 
differences-of  domestically entrenched interests with divergent preferences. 
Even if strategic interaction between the United States and Japan were indeed 
problematic, we could not speak intelligently of it without a clear picture of 
the two countries’ preference functions. The point, then, is to clarify the do- 
mestically derived national preference orders of the two major nations in the 
region. In this sense the analysis presented in this paper is simply the first step 
of the two-step process described above. My purpose is to understand the na- 
ture of these preferences more fully. I leave to others a more extensive explora- 
tion of strategic interaction between the two nations. 
In the Pacific context, the provision of the “infrastructure” necessary to sus- 
tain regional financial and monetary flows is first and foremost a function of 
American and Japanese policy. While strategic interaction between these two 
actors may color outcomes, I think the goals of the two countries are particu- 
larly important to explaining outcomes. The remainder of the paper uses his- 
torical and contemporary evidence to clarify the issue and its potential paths. 
10.3  The American Precedent 
A fascinating example of the effects of domestic political conflict on a coun- 
try’s  participation in managing the world  monetary and financial system is 
given by the interwar United States. The parallels to today’s Japan are striking. 
In the space of a few years, the United States leapt to a predominant interna- 
tional financial position. It was faced with many  of the problems of interna- 
tional cooperation currently facing Japan, and there was much domestic con- 
flict over how to confront these challenges. The interwar American experience 
with the domestic politics of national commitments to international coopera- 
tion in money and finance was grim. During the interwar years, indeed, opposi- 
tion from nationalistic forces practically stymied U.S. government participa- 430  Jeffry A. Frieden 
tion in efforts at  international monetary  and financial cooperation.‘ In  this 
context, it is worth seeing what lessons the American episode may hold for 
Japan. 
World War I catapulted the United States to international financial leader- 
ship. The Allies were deeply in debt to the U.S. government, and the financial 
reconstruction of European economies was largely entrusted to American pri- 
vate bankers. American trade and investment had come to predominate in Latin 
America, and even in Europe’s colonies and protectorates. 
The United States was at least as important an actor in  the international 
financial system in the  1920s as Japan is today.  By  1929, the United States 
accounted for 3  I percent of the stock of all international loans and investments 
outstanding (calculated from Staley 1935).  In capital flows, the American posi- 
tion was  overwhelming: while reliable figures are not available, the United 
States accounted for well over half of  all new international loans and invest- 
ments in the 1920s. By comparison, Japanese investors now account for about 
30 percent of all international direct investment flows; Japanese international 
banks account for 33 percent of  the global stock of cross-border bank assets. 
The total international and foreign assets of Japanese banks are, in fact, larger 
than the combined cross-border assets of banks from the next three most im- 
portant countries (the United States, Germany, and France) combined (foreign 
direct investment [FDI] figures from Froot 1991; bank asset figures from Bank 
for International Settlements 1991, 19). 
International finance and investment were also important to the U.S. econ- 
omy. Foreign bonds floated on Wall  Street averaged over a billion dollars a 
year in the 1920s, equivalent to more than one-sixth of annual corporate bond 
flotations. Foreign direct investment averaged over a half-billion dollars a year. 
In 1922, the stock of overseas loans and direct investments totaled $9.1 billion, 
equivalent to 12 percent of American gross national product (GNP); by  1929, 
it was $15.2 billion, equivalent to 15 percent of  GNP.2 
The importance of U.S. loans and investment to the interwar international 
economy was clear to contemporaries. American private capital financed large 
portions of total investment in Germany and in other central and southern Eu- 
ropean nations. American bankers arranged stabilization programs for Ger- 
many, Poland, Rumania, Italy, Belgium, and other nations. In Latin America, 
American loans and direct investment fed an economic euphoria known as “the 
dance of  the millions.” Princeton economics professor Edwin Kemmerer- 
the “money doctor”-roamed  the Western Hemisphere to supervise economic 
policies and certify their reliability to American investors (Drake 1989). 
1. What follows draws on Frieden (1987, 25-78;  1988). Only where information is not taken 
from these publications will exact citations be given. A parallel story involves the evolution of 
American domestic economic-policy institutions in response to changes in the international posi- 
tion of the U.S. economy; for one treatment see Broz (1992). 
2. Figures are from the Economic Report of the  President,  various issues. GNP for 1922 is 
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Important as the United States might have been to the world economy in the 
1920s, there were very divergent views among Americans about what policies 
were appropriate to this new reality. These different views reflected the diver- 
gent  interests of  major economic  interest  groups.  “Internationalism” was 
rooted in those associated with the country’s international economic predomi- 
nance, especially money-center banks and multinational corporations; it also 
found support among exporting farmers and a few industries with important 
foreign markets. Internationally oriented bankers and industrialists belonged 
primarily to the internationalist wing of the Republican party or were Wilson- 
ian Democrats; export agriculture was important to the southern Democratic 
party. For these groups, the world economy had come to be significant indeed, 
and they had a clear and present belief that the U.S. government should lead 
in stabilizing international monetary and financial relations. 
The internationalists believed that the U.S. government should reduce or 
forgive European war debts: “Those debts should be canceled,” J. P.  Morgan, 
Jr., said in 1922 (Forbes 1981, 125). The Allies owed the U.S. government $10 
billion, and American insistence on repayment helped destabilize European 
financial and monetary affairs. War debts complicated economic policymaking 
in Allied countries; they encouraged the French and Belgian governments to 
press demands for higher German reparations; and they reduced the ability of 
indebted nations to borrow privately. 
The international monetary agenda was also full and required American 
involvement. The dollar was  the only major currency that had not suffered 
serious disturbances during World War I, and it was the centerpiece of attempts 
to reconstruct the gold standard and stabilize European currencies. This re- 
quired coordination of  the policies of  the United States, Great Britain, and 
France, especially cooperation among central banks. 
Internationally oriented groups also wanted reduced American trade barri- 
ers. Those with overseas loans needed the American market open to their debt- 
ors, as investment banker Otto Kahn explained: “Having become a creditor 
nation we have got now to fit ourselves into the role of  a creditor nation. We 
shall have to make up our minds to be more hospitable to imports” (Maltz 
1963,204-5). American exporters feared that protection would lead foreigners 
to close their markets to American products. 
However, the  internationalists’ plans  for  international cooperation were 
thwarted by the hostility of the politically powerful isolationists. Isolationism 
found its principal socioeconomic base in portions of the U.S.  economy uncon- 
nected to the foreign sector. Despite a rapid expansion of overseas investment 
and trade, indeed, this activity was narrowly concentrated. Many manufactur- 
ers and farmers faced serious import competition and had no desire to see the 
U.S. government engage in cooperative ventures that would increase world 
trade and payments  or otherwise open the  economy further (Eichengreen 
1989b). 
The isolationists adamantly opposed trade liberalization, since they were 432  Jeffry A. Frieden 
under competitive pressure from abroad. By the same token, they saw no rea- 
son to spend taxpayers’ money to stabilize the currencies or regularize the fi- 
nances of their European competitors. Inasmuch as war debt forgiveness would 
make European economies  more competitive with the United States, it was 
undesirable; inasmuch as it would reduce U.S. Treasury income and perhaps 
require  tax  increases, it would depress domestic  economic  activity. Recon- 
structing the gold standard would only make it easier for foreigners to sell to 
the American market, especially as most monetary plans called for a strong 
dollar. On all counts, then, the isolationists opposed the country’s internation- 
ally integrated banks and corporations. 
Isolationist opposition thwarted most of the internationalists’ attempts to get 
an American government commitment to international monetary and financial 
leadership. Despite the prominence of American banks and corporations in 
the world economy of  the  1920s, American officials were absent from most 
discussions of international money and finance. At the Versailles Conference, 
the United States under Woodrow Wilson presented elaborate designs for the 
postwar political and economic order, including money and finance. After Wil- 
son was unable to obtain congressional approval for American membership in 
the League of Nations,  however, the U.S. government  was largely forced to 
abdicate the international scene. 
Most American official involvement in international monetary and financial 
negotiations  was  foreclosed  by  the  predominance  of  isolationist  sentiment 
within the United States. Supporters of a greater role for the U.S. government 
were unable to prevail in domestic debates over foreign policy. This forced the 
internationalists to cobble together private schemes for international monetary 
and financial management, and these schemes typically were fragile enough 
that they collapsed under strong economic and political pressure. 
The isolationists were anything but a fringe group. They were economically 
important, and the strength of  localist interests in Congress reinforced their 
influence. For all intents and purposes, the isolationists controlled Congress 
and  the  cabinet in  the  1921-33  Republican  administrations.  However, eco- 
nomic internationalists were often able to influence government agencies out 
of the public eye. Foremost among these was the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York, which was supportive of the interests of money-center banks. The State 
Department, too, tended to sympathize with international businessmen. In both 
cases, however, participation in attempts at international cooperation had to be 
carried out surreptitiously, for Congress blocked whatever it discovered. 
The limitations placed on the U.S. government  by  domestic isolationism 
made it extremely difficult for official American delegations to be openly in- 
volved in the most important monetary and financial negotiations of the period. 
For example, the stabilization of the German economy, carried out under the 
Dawes and Young plans, required American support, but the U.S. government 
could not be involved. While other parties to the agreements were represented 
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friends of J. P.  Morgan and Company, which provided the bulk of the original 
German stabilization loan. When, as part of the Young Plan, the Bank for Inter- 
national Settlements was established in  1930, partly to oversee German  fi- 
nances and partly to provide a framework for international monetary and fi- 
nancial cooperation, again the members were the European central banks and 
Morgan and Company. 
The Federal Reserve did participate in a series of  international monetary 
conferences in the 1920s and did cooperate with the Bank of England and the 
Bank of France on a number of dimensions. However, the Fed’s room to ma- 
neuver was severely hamstrung by  congressional sniping at the allegedly Eu- 
rophilic central bank, and less directly by  the unwillingness of Congress and 
the  administration to  make  concessions in  domestic economic policy  that 
might smooth the path of international monetary cooperation (Clarke 1967). 
Important as trade liberalization may have been for financial reconstruction, 
the protectionists within the United States prevailed at almost every turn. The 
trend toward liberalization begun under Wilson was reversed by the Republi- 
can protectionists, and tariffs were raised in  1921 and  1922. In  1930, the 
Smoot-Hawley Act raised American tariffs to extremely high levels (Eichen- 
green 1989b). 
The inability of the U.S. government to commit to international cooperation 
seriously undermined these ventures (Eichengreen 1992). On the one hand, 
American private investors were at the center of international finance. On the 
other hand, the US. government was almost nowhere to be found. American 
private bankers organized financial and monetary stabilization programs with 
the support of European governments, but without the support of the U.S. gov- 
ernment. U.S. overseas lending grew by leaps and bounds, along with the pro- 
gressive closure of the U.S. market to foreigners. The refusal of the U.S. gov- 
ernment to involve itself in international monetary and financial negotiations, 
and its unwillingness to take into account the international consequences of its 
policies, probably contributed to the collapse of  the already-fragile interna- 
tional monetary, financial, and trading orders during the Depression. 
The American example is one in which private overseas financial interests 
grew far more rapidly than the government’s willingness or ability to act on 
behalf of  these interests. This meant, specifically, that the U.S.  government 
simply did not help provide many of the club goods we have identified as po- 
tentially important to stable global monetary and financial relations. This was 
so much the case that American private bankers often found themselves driven 
to carry out these functions themselves, although the experience of  private 
businesses acting on these dimensions without government support was rarely 
positive. The disparity between economic activities and government support 
was large and grew larger with time. If this were to happen in Japan, we might 
expect difficult times both for Japan’s partners and for world money and fi- 
nance generally. 
The principal inference that can be drawn from the interwar American expe- 434  Jeffry A. Frieden 
rience  is  that  entrenched  domestic interests can  impede  the  evolution  of 
government  policies  to  help  stabilize international  money  and  finance- 
even in a country that dominates the international monetary and financial sys- 
tems. This makes it crucially important to understand the political balance 
of  power  among  various  domestic economic  interest  groups  in  countries 
faced with important international policy choices along these lines. The next 
sections survey the balance of power in contemporary Japan and the United 
States. 
10.4  Contemporary Japan 
Japan has come to dominate international money and financial markets, and 
international conditions have become extremely important to many  Japanese 
firms. Japan’s  rise to predominance has been almost as rapid as that of  the 
United States during and after World War I. In the late 1970s, Japanese invest- 
ors accounted for 6 percent of direct investment outflows from the major indus- 
trial nations, 2 percent of equities outflows, 15 percent of bond outflows, and 
12 percent of short-term bank outflows. By the late 1980s, the figures were 20 
percent of FDI, 25 percent of equities, 55 percent of bonds, and 50 percent of 
short-term bank outflows (calculated from Turner 1991,42-75;  a general sur- 
vey is Thorn 1987). Temporary difficulties can slow this process, but they are 
unlikely to alter the overall trend: Japan’s role in Pacific financial and invest- 
ment flows is extremely large and likely to grow larger. 
This process has made major Japanese banks and firms far more integrated 
into the international financial system. Japanese financial investors and inter- 
mediaries have  enormous overseas positions; as of  199  1, the  international 
assets of Japanese banks were $1.9 trillion, one-third of total international bank 
assets (Bank for International Settlements 1991, 19). The number of Japanese 
bank affiliates abroad went from 253 in 1975 to 913 in  1988, while affiliates 
of  securities firms went from 54 to 196 in the same period (Tavlas and Ozeki 
1991, 15). In 1990, foreign securities were 15 percent of total bank securities 
holdings, up from less than 3 percent in 1980 (Turner, 1991,77). The Japanese 
offshore market grew from nearly nothing in  1985 to almost half  a trillion 
dollars in 1991. 
Similar patterns  characterize major Japanese multinational corporations. 
The explosion of Japanese FDI in the late 1980s was concentrated in some of 
the country’s leading sectors: finance, real estate, and sophisticated manufac- 
turing (especially electrical machinery and transportation equipment). At this 
point, FDI is important to many major Japanese industries, including tradi- 
tional export producers that have  located production facilities in lower-cost 
regions (Froot 1991; Naya  1990). 
Many Japanese firms have come to depend on global financial markets as a 
source of funds. Indeed, Japanese issuers accounted for one-third of all interna- 435  The United States, Japan, and Pacific Money and Finance 
tional bonds issued in 1990-91  (Bank for International Settlements 1991, 15). 
Between 1984 and 1988, approximately half of all corporate bonds issued by 
Japanese residents were bought abroad, while the share of  foreign bonds in 
total corporate securities issues went from 11 percent in the late 1970s to 35 
percent in the late 1980s (Osugi 1990, 15,55). 
Japanese predominance in world and Pacific money and financial markets 
is not reflected in the corridors of  international and regional policymaking. 
Japan’s decision-making role in such multilateral financial institutions as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) is quite small, and more generally Japa- 
nese involvement in structural adjustment in the Pacific region is minimal. The 
United States continues to dominate at both the global and regional levels, 
even though Japan is a far more important provider of external finance to the 
world and the Pacific. The same is true of  the position of the yen in interna- 
tional currency affairs. The dollar remains the world’s vehicle currency, with 
the yen  typically third or fourth (depending on the use in question) after the 
deutsche mark, the ecu, or the pound sterling. 
Nonetheless, Japan’s global and regional positions in international money 
and finance have been changing. Perhaps the most easily measurable change 
is in fact in the use of the yen in international trade and payments. Yen  are but 
a small portion of total world official foreign exchange reserves, only about 8 
percent in the late 1980s, but this is up from just 3 percent in the late 1970s. 
The proportion  in  selected Asian  countries is much  higher, about 25 per- 
cent in the late  1980s, nearly double the figure of  a decade earlier (Tavlas 
and Ozeki 1991, 46). The use of the yen in international finance has also in- 
creased. In  mid-1991, some 17 percent of  all international fixed-rate bonds 
outstanding were denominated in yen, compared to 33 percent in dollars, but 
the two years up to mid-1991 saw more net new yen issues (23 percent) than 
dollar  issues  (19  percent)  (Bank  for  International  Settlements  1991,12). 
And  the foreign debt of  the major Asian borrowers (Indonesia, the Philip- 
pines, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand) is much  more heavily denominated 
in yen  than  in  dollars, 38 and  27  percent respectively (Tavlas and Ozeki 
1991,45). 
Qualitatively, Japan has been participating more actively in regional and in- 
ternational negotiations over monetary and financial issues. This has perhaps 
been most prominent in discussions of currency values across the Pacific, in 
which the yen-dollar rate has been a constant topic. Nonetheless, there is little 
doubt that the Japanese government is inconclusive about its commitment to 
systematic regional or global leadership. 
Many of the reasons for Japanese official ambivalence concerning regional 
and international monetary and financial relations can be traced to the domestic 
political economy. For purposes of  simplicity, we  can  identify two  broad 
groups in Japanese society, those with interests in more determined Japanese 
leadership in international and regional money and finance, and those whose 436  Jeffry A. Frieden 
interests lie more in safeguarding domestic conditions regardless of their exter- 
nal consequences. 
The sorts of policies in question consist of a wide range of issues. Japanese 
monetary and financial leadership would require the following measures, some 
of which are already under way: 
The liberalization of  the domestic financial system, in order to provide a 
broader and deeper market for yen-denominated assets. This would permit 
the yen to develop toward full key currency status. 
Continued commercial  liberalization, especially  toward  the  products  of 
countries with net liabilities to Japan. 
A major Japanese role in multilateral financial institutions. 
Domestic macroeconomic policies undertaken with a strong eye toward their 
international effects. This implies monetary and fiscal stability, and high lev- 
els of cooperation with American and European policymakers. 
These policies have differential effects within Japan and thus attract both 
political support and opposition. Those most inclined toward international co- 
operation are, not surprisingly, major Japanese banks and corporations with 
global interests. For them, whatever domestic price may be paid for Japan to 
help manage regional and world financial and monetary conditions pales in 
comparison to the benefits associated with stability in these arenas. Leading 
financial institutions may have  reservations about financial deregulation, but 
these are outweighed by the recognition that such deregulation is a prerequisite 
to a greater Japanese role (Rosenbluth 1989; Pauly 1988; for background see 
Suzuki 1987; Friedman 1986; Semkow 1985). The same may be true about the 
attitude of major exporters and multinationals toward trade liberalization, and 
toward the strong yen that macroeconomic policy coordination tends to imply 
(Rosenbluth 1991; Funabashi 1988, 87-107;  Frankel 1984; Green 1989; Car- 
gill and Hutchison 1988; Suzuki 1989, 91-171).  Their general sense that the 
trade-off of  domestic for foreign goals is worthwhile is heightened by  the 
greater ability of  internationally oriented firms to make up  abroad for what 
business they lose at home. 
Other groups in Japan are unenthusiastic about sacrificing domestic eco- 
nomic goals on the altar of regional or international cooperation. Such groups 
include producers of nontradable goods and services: construction, wholesale 
and retail trade. They also include many small and medium-sized manufactur- 
ing companies. While these companies often produce for export or subcontract 
for large export-oriented firms, they often concentrate in the production of 
standardized goods for which price competition is crucial. Such firms are thus 
very hard hit by  a strong yen  and trade liberalization, while larger firms in 
markets where nonprice competition is more important (automobiles, sophisti- 
cated electrical equipment) are less adversely affected. (Rosenbluth [  1991, 437  The United States, Japan, and Pacific Money  and Finance 
6-12]  has a good summary of the interests and organization of these business 
 group^.)^ 
The influence of small- and medium-scale businesses has traditionally been 
magnified by  the character of  Japan’s  political system. Liberal Democratic 
party (LDP) politicians have depended on local supporters in the small busi- 
ness sector, and have been quite responsive to their demands. This pattern was 
unproblematic so long as the policy preferences of small business were not in 
conflict with those of  big business-especially  in foreign economic policy. 
However, as big business has become more international, strife on these issues 
has increased. 
Although conflict between internationalist and nationalistic groups in Japan 
continues, there are reasons to believe that the balance of power is swinging in 
favor of the internationalists. The first reason is that internationalization of the 
Japanese economy continues apace. Unlike in interwar America, the process 
affects broad segments of  Japanese business. Second, the increasing impor- 
tance of unattached urban voters in Japan has reduced the relative influence of 
such localist groups as farmers and small businesses, which have tended to be 
nationalistic on economic policy. Third, the central LDP leadership is gener- 
ally able to enforce its policy preferences on LDP backbenchers, and the party 
leadership’s ties to big business tend to make it favorable to internationalist 
policies (Rosenbluth 1991). All these factors tend to push Japan toward more 
cooperative policies at the regional and international level, regardless of  for- 
eign pressure-albeit  not without difficulties and opposition. 
The possibilities for  a regionalist Japanese, or even Japanese-American, 
sphere of monetary and financial influence in Pacific Asia are often discussed. 
Most of  the evidence, regarded from the political economy standpoint taken 
here, does not seem favorable to such an outcome. Indeed, the traditional con- 
centration of Japanese foreign loans and investments in Asia has eroded in the 
past ten years; Japanese FDI has grown more slowly in Asia than in any other 
region. The United States and the European Community (EC) combined ac- 
counted for four-fifths of all long-term capital outflows from Japan in the late 
1980s: the most rapid relative growth in Japanese foreign investment was in 
the EC (Tavlas and Ozeki 1991, 31-33;  Froot 1991, 8-9).  This implies that 
policies that might cut Japan off from the European or North American mar- 
kets in favor of an exclusive Asian zone are unlikely to be supported by major 
externally oriented sectors. 
While the jury is most definitely still out, then, there are indications that 
Japan’s domestic political economy has become more hospitable to the coun- 
try’s playing an important role in regional and international monetary and fi- 
3. There is no doubt that this typology is far too crude for nuanced analysis. Japan exports 
some construction services; there are many dynamic and internationally oriented small firms;  and 
exceptions could be found to many of the patterns discussed here. I do not claim to have devised a 
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nancial policymaking. Those who stand to benefit directly from Japanese pro- 
vision of collective or club goods in these arenas have become more numerous, 
economically important, and politically influential. There are plenty of politi- 
cal obstacles to thoroughgoing Japanese commitment to these policies. If cur- 
rent trends continue, however, Japan is likely to avoid a repetition of the in- 
terwar  American  experience,  and to move  into a  position  of  leadership  in 
regional-and  eventually  international-money  and finance.  Of course, re- 
gional trends depend also on the policies of the United States, to which we 
now turn. 
10.5  Contemporary United States 
Concern about Japanese policy  focuses on incomplete progress toward  a 
greater international role, but the problem in the United States is the opposite: 
the possibility of a retreat into traditional economic nationalism. Although in- 
ternationally oriented economic groups remain politically very important, they 
appear to be in danger of losing ground to those less interested in American 
cooperation with Japan over regional and international monetary and financial, 
or other economic, issues. 
To be sure, the United States remains heavily involved in the world economy, 
as do many major banks and corporations. Indeed, explicit pressure for trade 
protection seems to be on the wane, as the result of three factors: the increased 
globalism of American industry, the development of greater export interests, 
and the generally weak dollar (Destler and Ode11 1987; Milner 1988). Nonethe- 
less, there  are residual  demands for trade  bamers from remaining  import- 
competers,  and  these  demands could  rise  if  the  domestic  economy  grows 
Probably the major source of future nationalistic pressures on economic pol- 
icy will be the accumulated liabilities of the United States, and of the U.S. 
government, to the rest of the world. It is indeed ironic that, while in the 1920s 
the principal  axis of debate over the role of the United States in the interna- 
tional economy had to do with foreign debts to the U.S. government, in the 
1990s the principal axis of debate will likely have to do with US. government 
debts to foreigners. 
Foreign holdings of over a trillion dollars in U.S. government securities, and 
of hundreds of billions more in corporate stocks and bonds, represent claims 
on future government  and private revenues. As these claims come due, they 
will be met by pressures to give them less priority  than domestic economic 
needs. Perhaps the simplest way to reduce the external debt burden would be 
to inflate it away, as almost all of the liabilities are denominated  in dollars. 
Support for such measures will come from those whose economic activity is 
wholly or primarily domestic-nontradables  producers, import-competers- 
for whom external debt service is an unmitigated drain. Support for more in- 
ternationally  cooperative  policies  will  be  centered  in  those  tied  to  such 
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internationally oriented activities as international banks and multinational cor- 
porations, for whom the costs of debt service are outweighed by  the benefits 
of untrammelled access to the global economy. Of course, temptations to shift 
some of the adjustment burden onto the shoulders of holders of government 
securities will face opposition both from foreigners and from wealth holders 
within the United States. This set of  issues will be crucial to resolution of 
America’s regional and international positions, but the contours of the debate 
and its outcome are still too murky to forecast-and  they depend too impor- 
tantly on the underlying state of the U.S. economy (Frankel 1988a). 
A related issue has to do with the conflict between domestic and interna- 
tional macroeconomic policies. The dollar remains the centerpiece of interna- 
tional trade and payments, and its stability is clearly of interest to most of those 
involved in the Pacific and world economies. However, confidence in the dollar 
can often be obtained only at the expense of  policies to spur domestic eco- 
nomic activity-and  vice versa. As above, interests on the relative importance 
of stability in the international value of the dollar as against efforts to stimulate 
domestic economic activity vary according to how involved the actors in ques- 
tion are in external as opposed to domestic business. And while the influence 
of more internationally oriented businesses-those  more interested in interna- 
tional macroeconomic policy cooperation-has  grown, the portions of  the 
U.S. economy still relatively unaffected by  external conditions remain very 
large (Destler and Henning 1989; Gowa  1983; Ode11  1982; on specific epi- 
sodes see Funabashi 1988, especially 65-86;  Cohen and Meltzer 1982, 15-64; 
Destler and Mitsuyu 1982). 
A specific problem that has long been contentious in American politics is 
that of  support for multilateral institutions, including the IMF-World  Bank 
system. Indeed, congressional support for the  1983 general increase in IMF 
quotas, which amounted to an $8.4 billion increase in the U.S. quota, was ex- 
tremely weak. The quota bill passed only because it was tied to a public hous- 
ing bill that the administration supported in return for the vote of key congres- 
sional Democrats on the IMF. The IMF bill’s problems were compounded by 
domestic economic weakness at the time and by  a very strong dollar-all  of 
which inflamed the opposition of import-competers, nontradables producers, 
and many others (Frieden 1987, 179-190). Such conflict will undoubtedly re- 
cur and will undoubtedly be exacerbated if the U.S. economy is not growing 
rapidly at the time. 
Other difficulties arise on the financial front, where the snail’s pace of fi- 
nancial deregulation in the United States risks impeding American contribu- 
tion to more integrated global financial markets. As is well known, the slow 
speed of deregulation is largely due to jockeying for position among financial 
institutions of  different size and functional specialization. Although the cost 
to the taxpayers of the savings and loan crisis and  the potential cost of similar 
problems in the commercial bank sector give an impetus to reform of the fi- 
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are quite high. It is unlikely that the desire of the most competitive and interna- 
tional of financial institutions to move the American regulatory environment 
into lockstep with that of Europe and Japan will prevail rapidly, costlessly, or 
without compromise. 
The political institutions through which economic interests are mediated in 
the United States are not especially favorable to those who desire more interna- 
tionalist policies. The interwar pattern of political institutions, with a highly 
decentralized government that was especially responsive to localist (and typi- 
cally nationalistic) groups, is still largely intact. Unlike in Japan, central party 
leaderships cannot impose the preferences of big business on local politicians 
more concerned with local conditions and pressure groups. The closest Ameri- 
can analogue is the executive branch, and the relative power of the president is 
constrained by congressional and bureaucratic institutions quite responsive to 
local political influences. The Treasury and the Federal Reserve System are 
closer to international business and somewhat autonomous from day-to-day 
political pressures, but even this is tightly circumscribed by legislative over- 
sight capabilities-as  has been demonstrated, most recently, by  battles over 
financial deregulation. American political institutions thus tend to reinforce 
the position of those least sympathetic to the sacrifice of domestic for foreign 
economic goals. 
Unlike in Japan, the intermediate position of a U.S. zone of economic influ- 
ence does not seem quite so far-fetched as Japanese resurrection of the Greater 
East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. Although the relative share of  Canada and 
Latin America in U.S. trade, lending, and investment has declined since the 
1950s, it is still quite high-on  the order of one-third to one-half depending 
on the arena. Negotiations on free trade agreements with Canada, Mexico, 
Chile, and other Latin-American nations are progressing; preliminary discus- 
sions are taking place about macroeconomic (especially exchange rate) policy 
in the region. However, considerations similar to those mentioned in the case 
of Japan tend to apply for the United States as well: most internationally ori- 
ented American businesses are not specifically concentrated in the Western 
Hemisphere and would not welcome Pan-American initiatives if  they would 
threaten markets or investments in Asia and Europe. 
The future of American international monetary and financial policy is un- 
usually difficult to predict because the domestic politics of American foreign 
economic policy are particularly sensitive to the state of the domestic economy. 
This is especially the case with the debt overhang and its impact on macroeco- 
nomic policy. If  U.S. economic growth is weak, there is likely to be much 
more significant opposition to measures that might threaten macroeconomic 
performance in the interest of regional or international cooperation. If growth 
is strong, such opposition will be mitigated. 
Nonetheless,  there  are  some  reasons  to  anticipate  that  nationalistic 
economic-policy pressures in the United States, although powerful, will not 
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higher than ever before. The rapid growth of inward direct investment has also 
increased the size of another support group for international economic-policy 
cooperation: managerial and production employees of foreign firms. Should 
the U.S. economy collapse, these more internationalist groups will be hard- 
pressed to prevail politically, but in the absence of  serious macroeconomic 
disturbances, they are likely to remain politically predominant, albeit not with- 
out a struggle. 
10.6  Implications and Conclusions 
The analysis presented here can be used to evaluate the probabilities of the 
various scenarios discussed at the outset of  this paper. The two pessimistic 
scenarios-one  in which Japan free rides on American Pacific leadership, the 
other in which Japan creates an exclusive monetary and financial zone in the 
Pacific-both  presuppose that inward-looking or exclusivist, regionally ori- 
ented groups will prevail over internationalist interests in Japanese domestic 
politics. Most of the evidence weighed here runs in the opposite direction, to 
indicate that internationalist groups have gained in influence and are likely to 
prevail in policy debates. Similarly, there is little evidence for bases of support 
for a primarily regional, as opposed to global, approach that would involve 
cooperation between the United States and Japan solely within the Pacific re- 
gion. However, this does not necessarily mean that optimism should prevail. 
Indeed, most of my analysis of the American political economy indicates how 
conditional policy outcomes are on unpredictable events, especially the state 
of the domestic economy. 
Indeed, one inference that can be drawn from this analysis of the domestic 
politics of Pacific money and finance is that the dangers of conflict come more 
from the American side than from Japan. Given the reversal in the net asset 
position of the United States, it is not unreasonable to expect growing dissatis- 
faction with the tradeoffs involved in continued American commitment to re- 
gional and international cooperation. Whether this dissatisfaction will translate 
into an all-out assault on current American policy, and whether it will predomi- 
nate  against the persistent strength of  internationalist interests, depends in 
large part on the state of the domestic economy. 
In  this context, an aspect omitted from this analysis can be reintroduced. 
Strategic interaction among national governments can affect the domestic poli- 
tics of regional and international negotiations (Putnam 1988). Specifically, the 
Japanese response to American demands, and to American political realities, 
can help reinforce the domestic political position of those in the United States 
who would like to maintain cooperative regional ties. This would require rec- 
ognition of the need to mitigate the cost of such regional cooperation to domes- 
tically oriented economic groups, and of the desirability of reinforcing the ben- 
efits of  cooperation to  already-supportive internationalist groups. Although 
there may  be  little justice  in  asking Japan  to bear  greater sacrifices than 442  Jeffry A. Frieden 
America for the good of regional cooperation, realization of domestic political 
realities in the two countries probably leads to the conclusion that this injustice 
may be the price paid for the maintenance of an  open and stable regional mone- 
tary and financial order. 
This analysis is unquestionably tentative, partial, and schematic. However, 
the very contours of the issues it addresses are still not entirely clear, and the 
information available to assess them is very sparse. As the issues and the data 
become more definite, more robust analyses and predictions may be possible. 
For now,  I am content to insist on the importance of  the domestic political 
lineup-both  the economic interests involved and the mediation of these inter- 
ests by political institutions-for  the future of Pacific money and finance. The 
specifics of this future will be resolved by both domestic politics and interstate 
negotiations, but we cannot understand one without understanding the other. 
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Comment  Takeo Hoshi 
Jeffry Frieden’s paper examines the possibility of international cooperation in 
money and finance between Japan and the United States. As the paper correctly 
points out, such an analysis must be carried out in two stages: analysis of do- 
mestic politics and analysis of the international game. This paper focuses on 
the domestic politics and classifies the major political actors into two camps: 
internationalists and nationalists. Comparing the relative power in each camp 
in each country, the paper concludes that Japan and the United States are likely 
to achieve cooperation. Internationalists are likely to be more influential than 
nationalists in both countries, although there is some possibility that the US. 
nationalists could gain enough power to impede the process toward cooper- 
ation. 
Focusing on the domestic politics, the paper gives us a good starting point 
for an examination of the likelihood of international cooperation. This is just 
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a starting point, however, and the analysis has to be refined and expanded to 
get firm conclusions. The analysis is preliminary not only because of its exclu- 
sive focus on the first stage of the two-stage game but also because of the lack 
of depth in its discussion of domestic politics. 
The paper identifies two camps that have opposing views about internation- 
alization, but it is too quick to conclude on the relative power of these groups. 
For example, the paper mentions three reasons the internationalists are likely 
to dominate in Japanese politics. The supporting evidence is, however, weak 
and not very convincing. 
The first reason internationalists are likely to dominate in Japan is because 
the Japanese economy will continue to become more international. It may be 
true that internationalization will increase the number of people who will gain 
from international cooperation, but this does not necessarily mean  that the 
power of internationalists will be enhanced. In fact, a larger population of in- 
ternationalists may make the internationalist camp weaker relative to the na- 
tionalist camp because of a classic collective action problem. The larger num- 
ber of  internationalists aggravates the collective action problem within the 
camp and makes the group politically less effective. 
The second advantage for internationalists mentioned in this paper is in- 
creasing importance of urban voters relative to localist groups such as farmers. 
If  this means that the number of  urban voters is increasing, then again the 
argument ignores the collective action problem, which becomes more serious 
as the size of a group increases. If  this refers to some radical changes in the 
Japanese political system that make urban voters more important, the paper 
should show exactly what these are. As long as the current election system 
continues, in which most Diet members are elected in local districts, it will 
always be important for politicians to maintain local support in order to be 
reelected. Thus the influence of localist groups is not likely to decline in the 
near future. 
It is also interesting to point out that fanners are not necessarily nationalists 
and urban voters are not necessarily internationalists. A good example is the 
recent discussion on liberalization of  rice imports in Japan, in which large 
farmers often expressed a favorable view toward liberalization. They hoped 
that import liberalization would pressure the government to abandon its food 
control system, which is government planning of production and distribution 
of  rice. Consumer groups generally opposed the import liberalization. They 
claimed that rice imports should continue to be prohibited so that they can 
enjoy safe Japanese rice. 
The third advantage of internationalists in Japan is the significant power 
exercised by  the central LDP leadership over its members. This statement, 
however, is an exaggeration. One can find several examples that show the LDP 
leadership often fails to force its policy preferences on individual members. 
One example is Prime Minister Nakasone’s attempt to introduce the sales tax 
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of  sales tax in January 1987, the local chapters of LDP started to voice their 
opposition. They were afraid of the voters’ response in the unified local elec- 
tions scheduled in April. The central leadership made several attempts to con- 
vince the members that they would be able to persuade the voters. First, they 
advertised that the tax reform package, which includes the sales tax, actually 
reduces the total burden of taxpayers, and the key issue is not the introduction 
of sales tax but the implementation of a tax cut. Then, the LDP National Con- 
vention for Advancement of Tax Reform was held on February 10, and Naka- 
sone made a forty-minute speech asking the members’ support for the tax re- 
form. All these efforts failed, and many individual members continued to voice 
opposition to the tax reform. In March, a candidate from the LDP lost in a 
supplementary election for the House of Councilors in Iwate prefecture, where 
the LDP had traditionally been very strong. And in April, the LDP lost several 
important seats in the unified local elections,  just as the local offices had antici- 
pated. At this point, Nakasone had no choice but to drop the sales tax bill. 
In each case discussed above, the analysis would be significantly improved 
by paying serious attention to some important factors that are not appreciated 
in the paper. Here I suggest three such factors. The first one is the collective 
action problem among the members of each camp: internationalist and nation- 
alist. The second suggestion is an explicit consideration of institutional con- 
straints, such as the election system. It is important to know if  the existing 
election system favors one camp or the other, or one group or another. The 
third factor is the resource constraint for each camp, or what each party can do 
to influence the government. For example, the paper argues that, if  the U.S. 
economy grows slowly, there will be more opposition to international coopera- 
tion from import-competers. The slow growth, and hence lower profits for the 
nationalists, however, affects their capability of influencing the government at 
the same time. Because lobbying is costly, although the nationalists’ incentive 
to  oppose the  international cooperation may  increase following the  slow 
growth, their ability to influence the government will be reduced. 
Another possible improvement of the paper is a general theory of what de- 
termines the line between the internationalists and the nationalist camps. There 
seem to be two factors that determine to which camp a political agent belongs. 
The first one is industry affiliation. If a firm belongs to an industry that benefits 
from international cooperation, then the firm becomes internationalist; if  the 
industry gains little or is actually hurt by  internationalization, then the firm 
becomes nationalist. The second factor is the position of the firm within the 
industry; whether it is large or small. The American experience after World 
War I discussed in the paper is useful to clarify the first factor, but it is not very 
helpful in identifying the second factor, the size of the firm. Looking at the 
experience in the same period in Japan may help establish that the size of the 
firm matters. During the late 1920s, the biggest policy debate in Japan was 
whether Japan should go back to the gold  standard. Since the government 
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ciated in the postwar period, going back to the gold standard also meant revalu- 
ation. Some of the supporters of the gold standard were large zaibatsus (fami- 
ly-owned  business conglomerates), like  Mitsubishi and  Mitsui (Nakamura 
1978). They knew that the Japanese industries would be hurt by  the revalua- 
tion, but they argued for the revaluation, because the troubles at weak firms 
would help increase their monopoly power. This episode shows that the size of 
the firm often affects its preference for internationalist and nationalist camps. 
Another example is the Japanese farmers’ attitude toward rice liberalization in 
contemporary Japan, mentioned above. Large farmers are for the liberalization, 
and small farmers are against it. 
The strategic interaction at the international level, which is omitted from the 
analysis in this paper, can potentially be important even for the analysis of the 
domestic level game, as Frieden correctly argues in his conclusion. The paper 
argues  that  the  favorable  Japanese  response  to  American  demands  may 
strengthen the internationalists in the United States. The argument, however, 
could go in the opposite direction. Seemingly opportunistic demands from the 
United States may strengthen the nationalists in Japan. Or if the international- 
ists in the United States see that cooperation is more likely because of Japan’s 
efforts, they may reduce their lobbying effort, which gives nationalists a better 
chance. Again, more substantial analysis is necessary. 
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